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Ignoring International Law: U.S. Policy on
Insurgency and Intervention in Central
America
Louis RENA BERES*
"I can assure you that in this Administration, our actions will be gov-
erned by the rule of law; and the rule of law is congenial to action
against terrorists." Secretary of State George Shultz**
Early in May, 1985, undaunted by Congressional opposition to fur-
ther funding for the contra rebels,' President Reagan urged plans to em-
bargo all trade between Nicaragua and the United States. These plans,
representing the latest response to what the President calls Nicaragua's
"aggressive activities in Central America,"2 express a continuing U.S. pat-
tern of disregard for the normative requirements of international law.
Nurtured by fear that Nicaraguan activities are "supported by the Soviet
Union and its allies,"3 they are offered without any respect for the per-
emptory principles of non-intervention and self-determination.
Curiously, in defending its forceful actions against the Sandinista
government, the Reagan administration no longer feels the need for legal
justifications. Although these actions were originally defended largely in
terms of the U.N. Charter's Article 51 provision for collective self-defense
(i.e., that they were undertaken by the U.S. in law-enforcing response to
alleged Nicaraguan support for anti-government rebels in El Salvador), 4
the current position of the Reagan administration is grounded exclusively
upon geopolitical considerations. As a result, the Reagan administration
* Professor of Political Science and International Law, Purdue University; B.A. 1967,
Queens College of New York; Ph.D. 1971, Princeton University.
** BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 629, TERROR-
ISM AND THE MODERN WORLD (1984).
1. At the time of this writing, there is evidence that this opposition may end and that
further support for U.S. military intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua will re-
ceive Congressional authorization.
2. Christian, Action Urged to Counter 'Aggressive Actions' by the Sandinistas, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 1985, at 1.
3. Id.
4. OFFICE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FOR LATIN AMERICA, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, BACKGROUND
PAPER: NICARAGUA'S MILITARY BUILD-UP AND SUPPORT FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN SUBVERSION
(1984). See also, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, NEWS BREIFING: INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ON EX-
TERNAL SUPPORT OF THE GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR (1984). The Reagan administration's
original "white paper" was widely discredited by press reports. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, COMMUNIST INTERFERENCE IN EL SALVADOR, REP. No. 80 (Feb. 23, 1981) with Kwitny,
Apparent Errors Cloud U.S. 'White Paper' on Reds in El Salvador, Wall St. J., June 8, 1981,
at 1, col. 6.
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seriously undermines worldwide respect for the rule of law. The most visi-
ble and dramatic manifestations of this country's "outlaw" behavior are:
(1) its wanton disregard for the territorial and jurisdictional integrity of
another state, and (2) its decision, announced on January 18, 1985, not to
participate further in proceedings of the case brought by Nicaragua in the
International Court of Justice.5
Initially, the Reagan administration also sought to justify its support
for contra activities in terms of the principle of humanitarian interven-
tion. It has now muted this rationalization, however, in the face of obvi-
ous policy contradictions. Since the administration continues to support
other regimes in the region that are vastly more repressive than that of
the Sandinistas,' its alleged concern for human rights is merely a contri-
vance. Indeed, it is now plain that U.S. tactics in Central America are
motivated entirely by Realpolitik and by the desolate machinations of
anti-Sovietism.
From the standpoint of modern international law, humanitarian in-
tervention certainly has its place. Operating within the severely limiting
context of a decentralized and sovereignty-centered system-one without
collective enforcement machinery-individual states must increasingly
act on their own to protect and promote human rights. In this connection,
however, the standard for permissible intervention must hinge, inter alia,
on more than ideological motives and it must be applied uniformly wher-
ever egregious violations are in evidence. The sharply divergent and in-
5. Dep't of State to the American Embassy at the Hague, telegram NO. 017113, Jan. 18,
1985. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U. S.), Juris-
diction and Admissibility, 1984 ICJ REP. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26).
6. According to the opening paragraph of the AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT: 1984
listing for Nicaragua: "Amnesty International's concerns included trials of political prisoners
which fell short of internationally accepted standards; the detention of prisoners of con-
science; the detention of political prisoners after their sentence had expired; and the pro-
longed incommunicado detention of political prisoners in the custody of the Direccion Gen-
eral de Segurdad del Estado (DGSE), Department of State Security. Amnesty International
welcomed the release in a December 1983 amnesty of most of the Miskito and Sumo Indian
prisoners known to the organization, some of whom it had believed were prisoners of con-
science." AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT. 1984 at 178.
A comparison with the opening paragraph of Amnesty's 1984 assessment of El Salvador
suggests a significantly greater respect for human rights in the Sandinista regime. Regarding
El Salvador: "Amnesty International remained gravely concerned about the continued in-
volvement of all branches of the security and military forces in a systematic and widespread
program of torture, mutilation, 'disappearance' and the individual and mass extrajudicial
execution of men, women and children from all sectors of Salvadoran society. Paramilitary
civilian defense squads which operated under military supervision as well as so called 'death
squads' were also consistently named as having been responsible for such abuses." Supra at
148. Despite the Reagan administration's assurances that Salvadoran human rights have
significantly improved after the latest elections, these assurances are utterly without empiri-
cal foundation. In the words of the Americas Watch Report on Human Rights and U. S.
Policy in Latin America: "The human rights situation in El Savador continues to be bleak
and heading for no significant improvement." See WITH FRIENDs LIKE THESE 138 (C. Brown
ed. 1985).
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consistent policies adopted by the Reagan administration in Central
America regarding "totalitarian" and "authoritarian" states fail to meet
this standard.
Within the current system of international law, external decision-
makers are authorized to intercede in certain matters that might at one
time have been regarded as internal to a particular state. While, at cer-
tain times in the past, even gross violations of human rights were de-
fended by appeal to "domestic jurisdiction," today's demands for exclu-
sive competence must he grounded in far more than an interest in
avoiding "intervention." This trend in authoritative decision-making to-
ward an expansion of the doctrine of "international concern" has been
clarified by Lauterpacht's definition of intervention:
Intervention is a technical term of, on the whole, unequivocal conno-
tation. It signifies dictatorial interference, in the sense of action
amounting to a denial of the independence of the State. It implies a
demand which, if not complied with, involves a threat of, or recourse
to, compulsion, though not necessarily physical compulsion, in some
form.
7
We can see, therefore, that intervention is not always impermissible,
and that, indeed, any assessment of its lawfulness must always be contin-
gent upon intent. Applying Lauterpacht's standard, where there is no in-
terest in exerting "dictatorial interference," but simply an overriding
commitment to the protection of human rights, the act of intervening
may represent the proper enforcement of pertinent legal norms. This con-
cept of intervention greatly transforms the exaggerated emphasis on "do-
mestic jurisdiction" that has been associated improperly with individual
national interpretations of Article 2(7) of the Charter and, earlier, with
Article 15(8) of the Covenant of the League of Nations. By offering a ma-
jor distinction between the idea of self-serving interference by one state
in the internal affairs of another state and the notion of the general global
community's inclusive application of law to the protection of human dig-
nity, it significantly advances the goal of a just world order.' But there
must be consistency. In Grenada, the Reagan administration-faced with
a threat from what the President described as "leftist thugs"-responded
7. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 167 (1950).
8. The importance of the changing doctrine of "intervention" to the shift in global "al-
location of competences" was prefigured by the Tunis-Morocco case before the Permanent
Court of International Justice in 1923. In this matter, the Court developed a broad test to
determine whether or not a matter is essentially within the "domestic jurisdiction" of a
particular state; "The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the domes-
tic jurisdiction of a state is an essentially relative question: it depends upon the develop-
ment of international relations." Although this test is hardly free of ambiguity, it does clar-
ify that the choice between "international concern" and "domestic jurisdiction" is not
grounded in unalterable conditions of fact, but rather in constantly changing circumstances
that permit a continuing adjustment of competences. It follows that whenever particular
events create significant violations of human rights, the general global community is entitled
to internationalize jurisdiction and to authorize appropriate forms of decision and action.
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with a "liberating" invasion.9 In Guatemala, however, where almost a
quarter of a million people have been exterminated during the past thirty
years by a succession of military dictatorships, the administration favors
the perpetrators of regime terror. Similar patterns of U.S. support are
enjoyed by the Stroessner regime in Paraguay, which practices genocide
against the Ache Indians under the approving eyes of the American em-
bassy in Asuncion, and by the Pinochet regime in Chile, which defiles
essential human rights on an almost equally savage scale.
Repression spawns rebellion. Although international law has consist-
ently condemned particular acts of international terrorism, it has also
made very clear that not all forms of insurgency are instances of terror-
ism. In fact, it has approved certain forms of insurgency that derive from
"the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peo-
ples under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domina-
tion...." This exemption, from the 1973 General Assembly Report of
the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, is corroborated by
9. The invasion of Grenada by U.S. military forces took place on October 25, 1983. Led
by 1900 U.S. Marines and Army Airborne Rangers, the invasion force also included 300
troops representing Jamaica, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, Antiqua and St. Vincent. By
October 30, the invasion had been completed and the island-a microstate located in the
southeastern Caribbean was "militarily secure." The stated U.S. governmental rationale for
the invasion was to protect the 1100 U.S. nationals residing on Grenada, including some 650
students at the St. George's University School of Medicine, and to meet an urgent request
by six Caribbean states that the U.S. assist in restoring political order on Grenada (states
belonging to the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), a regional body formed
by treaty in 1981). Moreover, in view of the President's explicitly-stated concern over the
9000 foot airport runway then being constucted by Cubans at Point Salines (a facility feared
as a potential fueling stop for Soviet planes carrying arms and other military equipment to
Nicaragua and as a base for launching "subversive operations" throughout the lower Carib-
bean basin), the invasion was also intended to counter Soviet-Cuban influence in the region.
Indeed, there is little question that its actual purpose was preeminently to depose the leftist
military junta that had seized power after the coup against Prime Minister Maurice Bishop,
and then to install a government to the United State's liking. None of these stated justifica-
tions, however, meets the requirements of international law. Although it is conceivable that
the lives of U.S. citizens had been endangered, the actual military operation took the form
of a wholesale assault against the authority structure of another government. To meet the
expectations of long-standing customary international law, the intervention should have
been severely restricted in application: i.e., it ought to have been conducted as a limited-
purpose rescue mission.
As for the rationale of collective action, nowhere in the operative collective security
provision of the 1981 OECS Treaty (Art. 8) is there an option to invite outside assistance
against a member state (the U.S. is not a party to this Treaty). Furthermore, Article 8 deals
with "collective defense and the preservation of peace and security against external aggres-
sion," yet there was no external aggressor. OECS Article 8 also requires unanimous agree-
ment among member states before action can be taken, and that condition was never ful-
filled. Finally, and this is perhaps the central flaw of the invasion's rationale, no state has
the right under international law to intervene militarily in the affairs of another state be-
cause it finds another regime ideologically distasteful or potentially harmful. Rather, inter-
national law expects that every state be free to choose its own form of political institutions
under the principle of "self determination". There is no support under international law for
"anticipatory self-defense" if the danger posed is purely hypothetical.
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Article 7 of the 1974 Definition of Agression by the U.N. General
Assembly.1"
International law has also approved certain forms of insurgency that
are directed toward improved human rights where repression is neither
colonial nor racist. Together with a number of important covenants, trea-
ties and declarations, the U.N. Charter codifies many binding norms on
the protection of human rights. Comprising a human rights "regime,"
these rules of international law are effectively enforceable only by the ac-
tions of individual states or by lawful insurgencies (i.e., those that com-
bine "just cause" with respect for the humanitarian rules of war.)
Where it is understood as resistance to despotism, revolutionary in-
surgency has its roots as accepted practice in the Bible and in the writ-
ings of ancient and medieval classics. Support for such insurgency is not
the creation of modern international law. The tyranncide motif can be
found in Aristotle's Politics, Plutarch's Lives, and Cicero's De Officiis. In
the Preamble to the U.N. Charter, the peoples of the United Nations re-
affirm their faith "in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of na-
tions large and small" and their determination "to promote social pro-
gress and better standards of life in larger freedom."
Article 1 lists a main purpose of the U.N. as "promoting and encour-
aging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." Similarly, in Ar-
ticle 55, the Charter seeks "universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language or religion." And in Article 56, all members of the
United Nations "pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes
set forth in Article 55."
Reinforced by an abundant body of ancillary prescriptions, this obli-
gation stipulates that the legal community of humankind must allow, in-
deed require, "humanitarian intervention" by individual states in certain
circumstances. Of course, such intervention must not be used as a pretext
for aggression and it must conform to settled legal norms governing the
use of force, especially the principles of discrimination, military necessity
and proportionality. Understood in terms of the long-standing distinction
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, this means that even where the
"justness" of humanitarian intervention is clearly established, the means
10. Interestingly enough, the most recent official U.S. government definition of terror-
ism does not allow for "just cause." According to a September 1984 definition offered by the
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs: "Terrorism is the use or threatened use of
violence for political purposes to create a state of fear that will aid in extorting, coercing,
intimidating or otherwise causing individuals and groups to alter their behavior." See Inter-
national Terrorism, DEP'T. ST. BULL. (Sept. 1984). By this definition, of course, the 18th
century revolutionary insurgency that led to the creation of the United States was pure
terrorism. Similarly, The U.S.-supported contras are also terrorists by this definition.
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used in that intervention must not be unlimited. The lawfulness of a
cause does not in itself legitimize the use of certain forms of violence.
We have seen, therefore, that contemporary international law con-
cerning human rights is necessarily founded upon a broad doctrine of hu-
manitarian intervention. Indeed, it is the very rationale of the prevailing
human rights regime to legitimize an "allocation of competences" that
favors the natural rights of humankind over any particularistic interests
of state. Yet, there is no evidence that U.S. support for the contras is at
all consistent with the imperative to oppose repressive governments.'
With such support, this country is not acting on behalf of the interna-
tional law of human rights. Rather, it is acting only to restore authorita-
rian repression to Nicaragua. Although this design does not flow from any
principled preference for regime terror, but solely from the presumption
that such terror is a "necessary evil" in the struggle against Marxism, it
represents a prima facie instance of aggression. Moreover, since U.S. sup-
port for contra rebels is directed against a country with which it has for-
mal diplomatic relations, this aggression may represent a remarkably dis-
ingenuous instance of lawlessness.
In support of the principle that foreign intervention is unlawful un-
less it is understood as an indispensable corrective to gross violations of
human rights, most texts and treatises on international law have long ex-
pressed the opinion that a state is forbidden to engage in military or
paramilitary operations against another state with which it is not at war.
Today, the long-standing customary prohibition against foreign support
for lawless insurgencies is codified in the U.N. Charter and in the authori-
tative interpretation of that multilateral treaty in the 1974 U.N. General
Assembly Definition of Aggression.
The legal systems embodied in the constitutions of individual states
are a part of the international legal order and are, therefore, an interest
that all states must defend against aggression. This peremptory principle
was expressed by Lauterpacht. According to Lauterpacht, the following
rule concerns the scope of state responsibility for preventing acts of insur-
gency or terrorism against other states:
International law imposes upon the State the duty of restraining per-
sons within its territory from engaging in such revolutionary activities
against friendly States as amount to organized acts of force in the
form of hostile expeditions against the territory of those States. It also
obliges the States to repress and discourage activities in which at-
tempts against the life of political opponents are regarded as a proper
means of revolutionary action. 2
Lauterpacht's rule reaffirms the Resolution on the Rights and Duties
of Foreign Powers as Regards the Established and Recognized Govern-
ments in Case of Insurrection adopted by the Institute of International
11. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT: 1984, supra note 6.
12. 3 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE LAW OF PEACE 2-6 (1977).
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Law in 1900. His rule, however, stops short of the prescription offered by
the 18th century Swiss scholar, Emerich de Vattel. According to Book 2
of Vattel's The Law of Nations, which states that support insurgency di-
rected at other states becomes the lawful prey of the world community:
If there should be found a restless and unprincipled nation, ever ready
to do harm to others, to thwart their purposes, and to stir up civil
strife among their citizens, there is no doubt that all others would
have the right to unite together to subdue such a nation, to discipline
it, and even to disable it from doing further harm.1"
In the aftermath of the Holocaust, the philosopher Karl Jaspers con-
sidered the question of German guilt. In this connection, he wrote:
"There exists a solidarity among men as human beings that makes each
co-responsible for every wrong and every injustice in the world, especially
for crimes committed in his presence or with his knowledge. If I fail to do
whatever I can to prevent them, I too am guilty." Understood in terms of
the Reagan administration's refractory disregard for ongoing crimes
against humanity in Central America, Jaspers' doctrine suggests an ur-
gent need to confront overriding Nuremberg obligations while there is
still time. Should we, as Americans, continue to support only lawless
forms of destabilization, we shall surely lose our historic commitment to
justice.
From the point of view of the United States, the Nuremberg obliga-
tions are doubly binding. This is the case because these obligations re-
present not only current normative obligations of international law, but
also the doctrinal obligations engendered by the American political tradi-
tion. By their codification of the principle that fundamental human rights
are not an internal question for each state, but an imperious postulate of
the international community, the Nuremberg obligations represent a
point of perfect convergence between the law of nations and the jurispru-
dential/ethical foundations of the American Republic.
The United States has been committed to the idea of a Higher Law
from its beginnings. Codified in both the Declaration of Independence
and in the Constitution, this idea is based upon the acceptance of certain
principles of right and justice that prevail because of their own obvious
merit. Eternal and unchangeable, they are external to all acts of human
will and interpenetrate all human reason.
This idea and its attendant tradition of human civility runs continu-
ously from elements of Mosaic Law and Greek philosophy to the Ameri-
can Revolution of 1776. By its actual conveyance of higher law or natural
law thinking into American political theory, John Locke's Second Trea-
tise on Civil Government echoed a more than two-thousand year tradition
that the validity of civil law must always be tested against pre-existent
natural law. The codified American "duty" to revolt when governments
13. 2 E. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 130 (C.W. Fenwick trans. 1916).
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commit "a long train of abuses and usurpations" flows from Locke's no-
tion that civil authority can never extend beyond the securing of man's
natural rights.
Significantly, the Declaration of Independence codified a social con-
tract that set limits on the power of any government. Its purpose was to
define a set of universally valid constraints upon secular political author-
ity. Since justice, which is based upon natural law, binds all human soci-
ety, the rights articulated by the Declaration of Independence cannot be
reserved only to Americans. Rather, they must extend to all human socie-
ties, and can never be revoked by positive or municipal law. It follows
that the principles of our own Declaration of Independence must shape
not only our own domestic political relations, but our relations with other
peoples as well. To do otherwise would be illogical and self-contradictory,
since it would nullify the timeless and universal law of nature from which
the Declaration derives. Indeed, this idea was reaffirmed recently by Sec-
retary of State George Shultz:
All Americans can be proud that the example of our Founding Fathers
has helped to inspire millions around the globe. Throughout our own
history, we have always believed that freedom is the birthright of all
peoples and that we could not be true to ourselves or our principles
unless we stood for freedom and democracy not only for ourselves but
for others."'
Curiously, the United States, founded upon the principles of revolu-
tion, has become the archetype of counter-revolution. Guided by short-
sighted economic considerations and supremacist politics, it has propped
up oligarachies, spawned militarism and thwarted hesitant national strug-
gles to enter the modern world. In this connection, Octavio Paz, the Mex-
ican poet and essayist, has commented:
This is tragic because American democracy inspired the fathers of our
Independence and our great liberals like Sarmiento and Juarez. From
the 18th century onward, for us modernization has meant democracy
and free institutions: and the archetype of this political and social mo-
dernity was United States democracy. History's nemesis: in Latin
America the United States has been the protector of tyrants and the
ally of democracy's enemies.15
Nuremberg established, beyond any doubt, the continuing validity of
natural law. While the indictments of the Nuremberg Tribunal were cast
in terms of existing or positive international law, the actual decisions of
the Tribunal reject the proposition that the validity of law depends upon
its "positiveness." The words used by the Tribunal ("So far from it being
14. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 659,
AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 1 (Feb. 22, 1985).
15. Paz, Latin America and Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP IN LATIN
AMERICA 9 (1982) (a special publication devoted to the voices and opinions of writers from
Latin America, Foundation for the Independent Study of Social Ideas).
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unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrongs were allowed to go
unpunished") derive from the principle nullum crimen sine poena (no
crime without a punishment). This principle is a clear contradiction of
the underlying thesis of positive jurisprudence, the idea of nulla poena
sine lege (no punishment without a written law).
As an answer to the question, "What is law?," international law now
rejects all solutions that substitute force for justice. Rather than accept a
distinction between the "concept" and the "ideal" of law, international
law now recognizes that concept and ideal coincide. In the fashion of all
other legal systems, the law of nations is a branch of ethics. Taken to-
gether with the understanding that the supremacy of natural law has al-
ways been a part of the American political tradition, and that the current
position of international law is largely an "incorporation" of this tradi-
tion, this conclusion signals a compelling imperative for change in the di-
rection of American foreign policy on human rights.
To meet its obligations, the Reagan administration must first bring
its policies into line with its stated principles. In its most recent issue of
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (1984), the U.S. Department
of State stipulates that:
our human rights policy has two goals .... First, we seek to improve
human rights practices in numerous countries... A foreign policy in-
different to these issues would not appeal to the idealism of Ameri-
cans, would be amoral, and would lack public support .... As the
second goal of our human rights policy, we seek a public association of
the United States with the cause of liberty's
These are decent and correct objectives of a nation's foreign policy.
The problem, of course, is that they are not a truthful expression of our
policy. They are intended exclusively for domestic and international po-
litical consumption. They have nothing whatever to do with the opera-
tional standards for U.S. involvement in other countries. They are a lie.
The Reagan administration embraces only one standard of judgment
concerning American foreign policy: anti-Sovietism. Human rights have
nothing to do with this standard. It follows from this standard that ef-
forts to overthrow allegedly pro-Soviet regimes are always conducted by
"freedom fighters" (even where these efforts involve rape, pillage and
murder 7 and where these regimes are substantially less repressive than
16. The Department of State is required to enforce the human rights provisions man-
dated by section 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended. The
Country Reports are also interesting for the strikingly different way they identify abuses in
"authoritarian" and "totalitarian" regimes and for their sharply different assessments from
those supplied by such independent human rights organizations as Amnesty International
and Americas Watch. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
17. Ironically, Secretary of State Shultz has often stated his commitment to the laws of
war of international law, and to the understanding that these humanitarian rules of armed
conflict apply as well to insurgent forces. According to Shultz: "The grievances that ter-
rorists supposedly seek to redress through acts of violence may or may not be legitimate.
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those of several U.S. allies) while efforts to oppose anti-Soviet regimes
(even where these efforts are essentially non-violent and undertaken by
the victims of genocidal regimes) are always conducted by "terrorists."
Consider President Reagan's press conference of March 21, 1985,
where he stated that the 17 blacks recently shot by South African police
had not been "simply killed," but were the excusable casualties of "riot-
ing." Moments later, reacting to a question about Nicaragua, the presi-
dent defended the use of force against a "Communist tyranny." In other
words, rebellion against apartheid must always be peaceful, while opposi-
tion to Sandinista rule must inevitably be violent. (This from the presi-
dent of a country founded upon the principle of "just cause" for
revolution).
With this view, black South Africans-although understandably un-
happy to be martyred by a uniquely repressive regime-are instructed to
be "patient" as the U.S. continues its policy of "constructive engage-
ment." At the same time, contra rebels-widely and authoritatively asso-
ciated with the execution of noncombatants in Nicaragua and with death-
squad activities in El Salvador and Honduras (not to mention their asso-
ciation with neo-Nazi groups in the United States)-are embraced by the
President as "our brothers." These "freedom fighters," said the President
on March 1, "are the moral equal of our Founding Fathers."
The central problem lies in this country's identification of East/West
competition as -the only meaningful axis of global conflict. Since such
identification makes anti-Sovietism the centerpiece of its policy on
human rights, the United States now fully accepts the pernicious doctrine
that might equals right. Rejecting former President Carter's declaration
of independence from "that inordinate fear of communism which once led
us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear,"' 8 it now offers a
parody of lawful and pragmatic behavior. Like a moth dancing in its own
flame, the U.S. is moved not by reason but by illusions of immortality.
The Reagan administration claims that it has now begun to change
its earlier views on human rights. Yet, there has been nothing to trans-
form its understanding of these rights as an instrument of the Cold War.
Clinging to the Manichean imagery of remorseless conflict between the
American Sons of Light and the Soviet Sons of Darkness, it is guided not
by the exigencies of politics but by the imperatives of "theology." With
such a desolate set of prescriptions, the President's trip to Bitburg Ceme-
tery in West Germany becomes easy to explain: We must learn to over-
look Nazism in order to compete effectively with the Soviets. Nazism was
The terrorist acts themselves, however, can never be legitimate. And legitimate causes can
never justify or excuse terrorism. Terrorist means discredit their ends." BUREAU OF PUBLIC
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 629, TERRORISM AND THE MODERN
WORLD 3 (Oct. 25, 1984).
18. From speech on "Humane Purposes in Foreign Policy," delivered at Commence-
ment Exercises at University of Notre Dame, Indiana (1977). Reprinted in THE HUMAN
RIGHTS READER 306 (W. Lacquer, B. Rubin eds. 1979).
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bad, but he would have us believe, only Communism is unforgivable.
In one of his best stories, Jorge Luis Borges, the Argentine writer,
describes a time in the future wherein governments no longer exist and
politicians have gone on to do what they are most capable of doing
(". . .some of them made good comedians or good faith healers. . ."). For
the moment, however, we must continue to deal with national leaders
who are hopelessly entombed by their barren imaginations and by the
banal syntax of power politics. Living outside of history, in parentheses,
these leaders will continue to oppose all forms of promising
metamorphoses.
The United States now founds its human rights policy on the prem-
ises of unreason. During the next several years, this policy will fail com-
pletely in terms of its own Realpolitik objectives as well as an instrument
of justice. In Nicaragua, for example, it is evident that the contras, even
with U.S. aid, have no chance of overthrowing the government. Moreover,
the prospect of Nicaragua becoming a satellite of the Soviet Union is tied
directly to Sandinista fears of continuing U.S. aggression. In other words,
the current policies of the U.S. regarding Nicaragua are not only unlaw-
ful, they are also self-defeating. They threaten to create the very condi-
tions they intend to prevent. Without a return to international law, the
prophecies of "another Cuba" will be self-fulfilled.
Should the Reagan administration continue to turn its back on inter-
national law in Central America, the victims of U.S.-backed repression
will eventually throw out their rulers. In the fashion of Nicaragua, each
successor government will join an expanding legion of states opposed to
the United States. Even more important, however, this country will lose
its capacity to bear witness as a righteous nation. A sinister parody of its
own best traditions, it will forfeit any remaining claims to moral leader-
ship, claims that lie at the heart of our widely-alleged superiority to the
Soviet Union.
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